representing a commitment to a certain standard of behaviour and set of values (manifest in the types of crimes it addresses), and to holding perpetrators accountable for the commission of crimes that violate these values. This raises two different but related sets of questions. First are questions about the exercise of jurisdiction over individuals on the international level; the Court rests on a broad conception of the legal identity of individuals in the international arena, and so raises questions about the basis of this legal identity. The second set of questions focuses on the basis for this standard of behaviour and shared values. Does this indicate that there is a moral component inherent in the law, or can it be explained in purely formalistic terms? Which legal questions are included in this model of jurisdiction?
Ultimately, I will argue that there are three bases on which the subject-matter model of jurisdiction depends: the heinous nature of the crime, its widespread impact, and the need to provide a more just and efficient method of ho lding perpetrators accountable.
As I will demonstrate, this is premised on two claims: first, inherent in the notion of humanity are fundamental rights which imply obligations to act or refrain from certain actions, and these rights and obligations that individuals have in relation to other individuals by virtue of their shared humanity trump a citizen's rights to its state. This notion of humanity forms the basis of an international legal identity of individuals who can now be parties to these legal disputes. Second, a commitment to the rule of law includes a commitment to a certain standard of behaviour, violations of which threaten the integrity of the law; as such, crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are not only morally condemned, they undermine the fundamental legality of the system in which they occur. Therefore, in the jurisdictional triangle, this notion of humanity and the commitment to the rule of law are what connect the parties, the crime, and the entity seeking prosecution.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly charged the International Law Justice is essentially related to their jurisdictional capacities. As Simons' model illustrates, one of the pieces of jurisdiction is the notion of 'parties' -those who can appear before the court.
States are the only parties that can be heard by the 198-200. 15 At this point, it will be instructive to take note of some relevant distinctions between the International
Criminal Court and other international tribunals. For example, objections to the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were raised on the grounds that they violated three principles of international law: no law, no crime; no law, no punishment; and non-retroactive law-making. These principles have become enshrined in the Rome Statute, which has been worked out to resolve these problems. Although the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda may also be able to escape these objections, they are ad hoc tribunals established at the end of the Cold War, and have limited territorial and temporal jurisdiction, unlike the ICC which will be established as a permanent court with a much broader territorial jurisdiction. Further, the International Criminal Court will be somewhat less powerful then these two ad hoc tribunals, because the ICTY and the ICTR have concurrent jurisdiction with national courts and may exercise primacy over them. seems to imply a territorial model of jurisdiction. But it is questionable whether this is really an accurate portrayal of the jurisdictional basis of the Court. The motivation behind the Court is the general abhorrence of certain crimes and the need to develop a mechanism to hold perpetrators accountable; therefore, it seems to be that it is the nature of the crime that serves as the source of acceptance of the Court's authority. In addition, the complex procedures for extending the Court's jurisdiction imply that the connection to the state is not as fundamental as it first appears, and so there is a sense in which the Court does create an individual legal identity independent of states.
The problem with a legal identity independent of states lies in ascertaining the source of this identity. States can accept the claim that they have jurisdiction over their own nationals for international crimes, because jurisdiction is justified by a link to the state, thereby fitting nicely within the framework of the sovereign state system and the territorial triangle model. An individual legal identity independent of the state rejects the link with the state; but in doing so, it raises important questions: What occupies the apex of the territorial triangle model? What justifies the exercise of jurisdiction over any individual, anywhere?
The answer to these questions requires a closer look at the role played by the state in the territorial triangle model. A key feature of jurisdiction, which is nicely illustrated by the territorial triangle model, is the element of agreement: the parties to the dispute must accept the authority over the entity claiming jurisdiction in order for them to accept its judgments as binding. Thus, the element of agreement is a characteristic concern of any jurisdiction, and in the territorial model, this is provided by the state. Therefore, it seems that, by making the agreement piece explicit, the triangular model does grasp a crucial feature of the concept of jurisdiction. The question is thus whether the state must always be at the apex of the triangular model. If the territorial link is abandoned, then, something else must occupy the apex -there must be some grounds on which the parties to the dispute will accept the authority of the decision-maker to resolve their dispute.
In order to fill this gap, there must be a connection between the parties (i.e. individuals), the crimes (i.e. genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity), and the authoritative decision-maker (i.e. the Court). Thus, the International Criminal Court forces the issue of the justification for criminalizing these acts. The justification can not be that the international community as a whole accepts that these crimes are wrong, because, as both history and the present clearly show, this is not the case. In the following section, I argue that there is a specific content to the notion of humanity that demands a certain minimal level of protection; in addition, I maintain that a commitment to law also indicates a commitment to a certain standard of behaviour, such that there can not be an international legal order built on a commitment to genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. It is this notion of humanity, as well as a commitment to the rule of law that provide the connection between the parties, the crimes, and the authoritative decision-maker in the subject-matter model jurisdictional triangle.
Humanity, Legality, and the Jurisdictional Triangle
As previously discussed, the crimes over which the International Criminal Court will have jurisdiction are war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This list probably does not inc lude piracy and slavery because these crimes are accepted as crimes over which states can exercise universal jurisdiction. Interestingly, they are also crimes which are committed with much less frequency. In contrast, war crimes, genocide, crimes of aggression, and crimes against humanity are still included in many state policies. This raises the question, what do these crimes have in common that triggers the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court? Perhaps the answer can be found in the effects of these crimes, which have a widespread impact on humanity, producing human suffering, terminating life, and violating human dignity.
Therefore, underlying the very idea of these crimes (especially crimes against humanity)
is the notion that there is a common element that unites all individuals, regardless of what territory they happen to be in. This common element is an interest in avoiding suffering, preserving life, and maintaining dignity. According to Richard Falk, world order has been analyzed for centuries as if human suffering were irrelevant, and as if the only fate that mattered was either the destiny of a particular nation or the more general rise and fall of great powers, the latter being regarded as an inevitable consequence of the eternal, natural rivalry of self-serving states competing for territory, wealth, influence, and status. invoked by one group of people against another who share the same territory, creating an 'us vs.
them' mentality. I do not mean to dismiss nationalism, which admittedly has encouraged the recognition that cultural differences merit prima facie respect, and has even played an important role in making certain unive rsal understandings of rights possible by contributing to a notion of citizens' rights. Rather, I wish to suggest that one negative consequence of the state system has been to drive wedges between individuals by insisting that individuals are primarily citizens of states, and that their interests are secured by securing state interests, complicating efforts at cooperation at the international level.
Falk sees the solution to gross human rights abuses in "the deepening and expansion of democratizing tendenc ies, making leaders more consistently receptive to international law, and to the guidelines spelled out in the main human rights instruments," 22 and argues that the construction of a global morality premised on a universal conception of human rights is essential With these definitions, Kaldor argues that the control of organized violence is an essential precondition for effective governance. It is inseparable from another essential precondition: legitimacy. On the one hand, the ability to maintain order, to protect individuals in a physical sense, to guarantee the operation of justice and the rule of law, are the primary functions of institutions from which they derive their legitimacy. ... On the other hand, it is not possible to provide security in the sense just defined without some underlying legitimacy. There has to be some mechanism ... that explains why people obey rules.
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Therefore, central to the legitimacy of a legal system is its ability to provide individuals with security, and its ability to effectively guide behaviour will depend on the degree of security it provides.
Kaldor's argument takes for granted that law is an institution established to guide behaviour in such a way as to provide individuals with the security to live in peace with others.
Kaldor's picture of law does not depend on a fundamental connection between law and morality; rather, both conceive of law as being purposive. As such, the subject-matter model of jurisdiction can link the parties to the crimes by virtue of their impact on the law's ability to 
Objections to the International Criminal Court
The increase in the commission of crimes that are not contained with national borders, coupled with the inability or unwillingness of states to prosecute perpetrators of these crimes, seem to necessitate the establishment of a legal entity capable of providing effective resolution of these issues. However, there exists strong opposition to the International Criminal Court in the international community. In this section, I will outline these objections, showing that they are essentially objections to the subject-matter model of jurisdiction.
The obstacles to the establishment of the International Criminal Court are largely a result of the permeation of realist theories of international relations. The realist position rejects the possibility that there are any universal standards of morality, and insists that the international community is driven by state interests. Allen Buchanan explains that, "according to the Realist theory, the structure of international relations precludes moral action except where it happens to be congruent with state interest. The importance of creating norms by state consent, on this view, is that it provides a way for states, understood as purely self-interested actors, to promote their shared long-term interests in peace and stability." 36 Falk adds that "the established order, realists argued, can be protected only by military means, and in this sense, legal and moral rules of prohibition are futile, and even dangerous to the extent that they induce complacency." 37 The
Realist position assumes that the members of the so-called community of states are moral strangers, that the state system is a mere association of distinct societies that do not share substantive ends of a conception of justice, rather than a genuine community. In the absence of shared substantive ends or a common conception of justice, 
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as nationals of other states, identify themselves as members of states, and as having primary responsibilities to the state, rather to others by virtue of their humanity. According to Falk, "any genuine alternative, then, to realist morality must be predicated upon a comprehensive vision of global security." 47 In other words, it must be premised on the claim that there is an element inherent in the notion of humanity that implies certain rights by virtue of this humanity, and that the individual -not the state -comes first in the international community. However, this perspective of the primacy of the individual as a human with rights and responsibilities raises problems for the sovereign state system.
The International Criminal Court and the Sovereign State System
The impact of the International Criminal Court on state sovereignty is directly related to jurisdictional issues. Can a sovereign state surrender its sovereign responsibility to prosecute and enforce certain crimes, or in certain circumstances, without surrendering sovereignty in its entirety? In other words, is the International Criminal Court, operating on a subject-matter model of jurisdiction, which does not rely on any territorial connection, compatible with the current system of international relations?
Underlying the subject-matter model of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is a commitment to the rule of law and a conception of the individual as having certain rights and responsibilities by virtue of his humanity. The Court can thus be seen as a shift among the members of the international community, toward a "pre-Westphalian" mentality, in which the members of the international community reject realist assumptions and are more willing to provide, then perhaps the international community is moving toward replacing the sovereign state system with a version of a right-duty relationship as the basis for these claims.
The sovereign state system is structured so as to perpetuate power struggles between states. It is important to recognize that the sovereign state system does not reproduce itselfthose in charge do. The state system confers an enormous amount of power on those who happen to be in charge, providing a substantial incentive to maintain the state system, and refuse to allow an external authority to exist which may take away some of that power. Further, there are many benefits associated with sovereignty; because attaining sovereign status is largely dependent on recognition by the international community (i.e. the other sovereign states), states can apply pressure on those seeking statehood in a variety of different ways. For example, one criteria for membership in the international community -for recognition as a sovereign state -is being a signatory to the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As such, pressure can be placed on governments to sign the Declaration. However, sovereignty can be and has been used by non-democratic (even by supposed democratic) states to justify, rather than address violations of human rights. The United Nations, which endeavours to address such human rights violations, simultaneously affirms the legitimacy of the sovereign state system.
The problem with this is that states can use their sovereign status to claim authority over determining the scope of human rights within their jurisdiction. Although the United Nations can, in some cases, require states to sign international treaties, which have been used to establish international law, sovereignty gives individual states complete responsibility to enforce international law. But if states sign treaties with no intention to comply with them, then the lack of an external entity capable of intervening in the domestic authority structures of the state, which would constitute a violation of sovereignty, means that there is no body that is capable of enforcing those treaties, and international law is merely symbolic, or worse, a political weapon.
As such, achieving and maintaining meaningful compliance to international agreements does not seem possible without an effective means of enforcing those agreements.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has been motivated in large part by seemingly widespread inability and unwillingness of the international community to effectively and legally address the commission of atrocities in an increasingly global society. As Bassiouni and Blakesley note, the need to develop an international criminal code and an international criminal court is indispensable in the context of the transient nature of international society, the sophistication and transnational nature of modern crime, and the everincreasing interdependency of the new, international world order. As the world becomes a smaller place, the various parts and peoples are more interdependent and more concerned with the same problems of international and transnational criminality. Therefore, greater cooperation and coordination are required.
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One can not help but wonder why there has been so much difficulty in attaining cooperation and coordination on these matters. Through the principle of non-intervention, the sovereign state system has created a space in which not only criminal and terrorist groups, but state leaders feel comfortable, and even consider themselves justified in committing heinous acts, because they do so in the name of the state. As such, there is a need to explore ways in which the perpetrators of such atrocities can be held accountable for their actions without threatening to undermine the system, which is the motivation behind the International Criminal Court. In this paper, I have attempted to give a comprehensive account of the jurisdictional basis of the International Criminal Court. I argued that, even though it is a treaty-based tribunal, implying a necessary territorial connection, this connection is not an essential justificatory element of the exercise of jurisdiction. In the subject-matter model of jurisdiction, the three elements which determine which legal questions fall under its scope are the heinous nature of the crime, the crime's widespread impact, and the ability to provide more just and effective prosecution. The nature of the crime which triggers the exercise of jurisdiction is related to both a conception of humanity as being defined by a shared interest in preserving life, avoiding suffering, and maintaining dignity, as well as to a commitment to the rule of law.
The renewed vigour of the movement toward establishing the International Criminal
Court has been closely related to the emergence of an international consensus that human rights are a legitimate component of international law. 52 However, within the sovereign state system, the application and enforcement of international law is a state responsibility. This has created the need to develop principles legitimating the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to address crimes that are not contained within a single state's boundaries. Subsequently, while the international community struggles with the application of principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction, many gross violations of human rights go unpunished.
I have tried to show that such problems are in large part due to confusion with regard to the concept of jurisdiction. In the sovereign state system, it is taken for granted that a legal system is necessarily tied to a specific geographic location, and so the concept of jurisdiction appears to be nothing more than a feature of sovereignty. This produces a territorial triangle model of jurisdiction, which consists of specific links between the parties to the dispute and the Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity have forced the members of the international community to recognize that they share an interest in justice and the rule of law, and that traditional ways of responding to crime are no longer adequate. As such, the International Criminal Court can be seen as a foundation on which to build an international legal and political system that can respond meaningfully and effectively to the challenges of a global community.
Falk urges the acknowledgment "that international relations is a social construction, and But it is up to individuals to infuse international relations with a normative component, and a jurisdictional model based on subjectmatter offers just such an opportunity. However, in the context of international law, the subjectmatter model of jurisdiction consists of more then a moral imperative. The basis of the subjectmatter model of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is also based on the recognition that if certain acts are permitted -for example, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity -they violate the principles of the rule of law in such a way as to prevent the law from being able to fulfill its purpose and undermine the international legal order.
Therefore, as we move toward a global society, the integrity of the international system is going to require an authoritative body capable of enforcing international commitments, and of addressing the new opportunities for criminal activity produced by globalization. 
